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ABSTRACT 
The landscape of the high country and the changes that are occurring to it are discussed. 
These changes may be viewed as either negative or positive. One agent of change is the 
self-spread of exotic conifers, and this is a focus of the study. This is because many of the 
possible changes occurring to the high country landscape are, or can be, a consequence to the 
possible responses to this spread. Benefit-cost analysis is considered as a tool for assisting 
in making decisions. Because the landscape is a classic public good it has a non-market 
value that is not readily apparent. If rational decisions and responses are to be made about 
the changes occurring in the high country, the non-market values need to be quantified and 
considered. Various methods of non-market valuation are briefly assessed. The contingent 
valuation method is considered most appropriate for assessing the non-market values of the 
high country landscape. However assessing the landscape is considered to be a personal and 
subjective experience. There is a lack of familiarity of viewing the landscape as a commodity 
within a context of tradeoffs. There is a likelihood of "contamination" of any value derived 
by ideological or non-economic values. Problems with willingness-to-pay measures not 
reflecting the "true" compensation that would be required because of the phenomenon of loss 
aversion are also considered. Consequently it is considered that given the present state of the 
arts that any measurement using contingent valuation would be subject to serious distortion. 
However, it is noted that even order of magnitude estimates can be of value in the decision 
making process. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The high country of the South Island of New Zealand forms an extensive and distictive 
landscape. While it has a semi-wilderness appeareance, it is a human-induced landscape, 
first through the burning of forests by the Maori, and then through grazing of sheep 
(Ashdown and Lucas, 1987). As with all landscapes it is in a continual process of change, 
both from natural and human-induced sources. These changes may vary from beneficial to 
detrimental, manageable to impossible to manage (White and Bratton, 1980). Changes that 
are occurring in the high country range from successional processes, either natural or 
induced, through to developments such as plantations, bulldozed tracks or "shiny sheds". 
Because of the volume of change that has occurred in recent decades there is concern in some 
quarters that the the landscape quality of the high country is in decline (Rackman et al., 
1983). Some changes, such as the reduction of gazing pressure, results in other changes, 
such as the establishment of self-seeded or "wilding" trees. Because of the ecology of exotic 
conifers, they have a considerable potential to colonise much of the high country. This 
would have, not unexpectedly, a considerable impact on the landscape. However, whether 
peop~e would view this as a positve or a negative change is a matter of much conjecture. 
Options suggested in response to the spread of conifers range from "do nothing", manage 
for wood products, through to control. Associated with all these options however are 
various costs and benefits and to arrive at an economically efficient solution these need to be 
known. 
Because the landscape is a classic public good ( that is: the enjoyment or utility derived by 
one person does not deminish that available to others) (Price, 1978) it has a non-market value 
that is not readily apparent. If rational decisions and responses are to made about the 
changes occurring in the high country, the non-market values need to be quantified and 
considered. However before these non-market values can be quantified, the various methods 
available need to be assessed as to their applicability or appropriateness for this particular 
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situation. With a focus on the contingent valuation method it is this specific problem that this 
project attempts to address. 
This topic of the appropriateness of non-market valuation to the high country landscape is 
important for a number of reasons. As with any tool the limitations on its use needs to be 
understood, otherwise spurious information may be produced. If maximising the overall 
social welfare of the people of New Zealand is considered a worthy objective, then it needs 
to be known what the various costs and benefits of available options are, in order to arrive at 
an economically efficient solution. However if the assumptions from which non-market 
values are derived are faulty, or the degree of reliability not appreciated, it is not possible to 
make sound decisions. The resultant unsound decisions are likely to result in economic 
efficiency not being attained. Along with producing bad (or non.:.optimal) decisions, if 
non-market valuation is used in inappropriate contexts, it would bring into ill repute 
techniques that are useful and valid in other, more amenable contexts. 
To assess the applicability of contingent valuation for valuing the high country landscape the 
project has been structured in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 reviews what (and where) the high country landscape is; what the changes 
occuring to it are (with particular emphasis on the spread of wilding conifers); options 
available to respond to this change; and the rationale for protecting a portion of this 
landscape. 
Chapter 3 reviews benefit-cost analysis and the concepts of social welfare, utility and 
efficiency; the requirement to have non-market values; the concepts that make up non-market 
values; and the various non-market valuation methods available. 
Chapter 4 considers the process of evaluation of landscapes; reviews the contingent valuation 
method, its biases, and the conditions under which it should be used; assesses its 
appropriateness to the valuation of the high country landscape; and comments on the degree 
of accuracy needed. 
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This assessment however must be viewed in the light that non-market valuation is a relatively 
young field of endeavour, and that techniques and methods are evolving at a rapid rate. 
Conclusions reached today may not be valid tomorow in the light of new knowledge. 
The contribution to be made in making this assessment of the contingent valuation method 
are twofold. One, it will clarify whether or not it is a useful technique, or what the 
limitations of its use are, to potential users such as government agencies like the Department 
of Conservation and the Ministry for the Environment, that have an interest in the 
management of the high country. As a consequence, if it is appropriate for their needs, they 
may be able to use the techniques to be better able to achieve their goals or seek more 
appropriate levels of funding. Two, it draws attention to an apparent gap in our knowledge 
as to what an economically efficient or desirable level of protected landscapes we as a nation 
want (or can afford). While Ashdown and Lucas (1987) have drawn attention to the need to 
preserve tussock grassland landscapes, and Taylor (1986) reviews fmancial incentives for 
the conservation of landscape, the question that remains is "How much?" Kelly and Park 
(1986) appear to accept the limitation of "available fmance" without asking if it is at an 
appropriate level. Only Murray (1986), who investigates the attitudes and opinions of high 
country farmers to exotic forestry, recognises that "trade-offs" between various land use 
options can only be accounted for by subjective valuation. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HIGH COUNTRY 
Tussock grasslands are a predominant landscape in the high country. It is however an 
induced landscape that is undergoing continual change. Some of these changes are 
described, but the focus of this chapter is on the self-spread of exotic conifers, and possible 
responses to this change. The chapter finishes with a summary of some of the reasons 
presented for protecting a portion of the landscape. The question posed though is "How 
much?" in order to be economically efficient. 
Landscapes in which tussock grasslands are prominent are widespread in New Zealand. 
These grasslands give rise to a range of distinctive landscapes. Most of these grasslands 
occur east of the main divide in the South Island. Much of this grassland is under pastoral 
lease or pastoral occupation licence (2.6 m ha out of a total of 2. 7 5 m ha)(Ashdown and 
Lucas, 1987). "Short tussock grasslands are, in the main, induced vegetation. As such they 
are part of our cultural heritage requiring grazing to maintain their present physiognomy." 
(Swaffield and O'Connor, 1986). They have been created by the 
" ... clearance of forest and scrub by fire [for the role of fire, especially in early 
Polynesian times, see Molloy et al., 1963] and maintained as such by 
subsequent management [and although] farming practices have often induced 
rather artificial environments, these farmed grasslands are still an impressive 
visual resource [and] in many areas a sense of spacious wilderness still 
dominates .... " (Ashdown and Lucas, 1987). 
Lucas (1987) considers that it is 
" ... the vegetation which visually sets the high country apart from other 
regions in New Zealand. This vegetation results in a semi-wild character, which 
is possible because people do not appear to dominate -- there is a lack of 
dominating developments or formal human-created patterns." 
Consequently, the high country is considered to have certain landscape values that are 
ascribed to it, based on ecological, cultural, visual, and economic values ( Ashdown and 
Lucas, 1987 ). 
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"While regularly referred to as 'natural' landscape in reality the High Country is the result of 
both natural and human activities. It has never been static and is today in a state of constant 
change" (Rack:man et al., 1983) and as a consequence the values attached to landscape are 
subject to change from a number of different areas. It is in the nature of landscapes to 
change as it is a dynamic and inevitable process. The factors that alter these values may be 
natural or induced ecological changes, such as natural successional processes or the invasion 
of exotics; changes in management strategies such as oversowing and topdressing or planting 
shelterbelts and plantations; or developments such as bulldozed tracks, power pylons or a 
"shiny shed". Rack:man et al. (1983) note that 
"The sheer volume of cultural change witnessed in the last few decades has 
inevitably led to concerns that the landscape quality is in decline- the dramatic 
'natural' spacious panoramas of the inland basins will be lost forever unless 
something is done now." 
This, however may not be true. 
Different people, at different times, places or contexts, may consider these changes either 
beneficial or detrimental, positive or negative, with regards to the value that they derive from 
that landscape. Indeed, as Price (1978) notes, "The individual himself also changes in his 
reaction to the landscape. In various states of mind he may like or dislike landscape of 
different types, or may inconsistently prefer one feature or element over another .... " The 
aesthetic preferences of individuals according to Price (1978) are affected by the cultural 
norms, people being responsive to whatever conforms to the cultural tradition of the time and 
place, and what he refers to in a narrow sense as quality, which is conformity with all known 
and unknown principles of aesthetics. Consequently, for example, while "afforestation is 
damaging to the aesthetic tradition of the British uplands .... new generations build their 
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associations elsewhere .... [and] the consumer [of landscape] is replaced by others for 
whom the new condition of landscape is familiar" (ibid.). Hayward and O'Connor allude to 
this when they comment that "Holiday makers travelling from Geraldine to Fairlie are more 
likely to remark 'Haven't the trees grown' than lament the loss of grasslands, scrublands and 
forests of past landscapes" (Hayward and O'Connor, 1981). 
One view of change in the high country (Lucas, 1987) notes 
"The open character of the high country landscape makes it highly vulnerable to 
the impact of obvious insensitive developments which come in many forms: a 
zig-zag track over a smoothly curving ridge; a shiny shed in a dull setting; a 
bright square of lucerne sitting on a prominent fan; windbreaks, woodlots and 
wilding trees in open grassland. But the greater threats to our. high country 
landscapes are the slow, subtle changes, changes which many closely associated 
with the land do not notice because they are so close to it. Over time tussocks 
are replaced with other pasture species in a process traditionally referred to as 
"improvement" of tussuck grasslands. The improvement that involves the 
gradual loss of the tussock component sees the tawny hills changed with a new, 
simple landcover that has no semi-wild or remote quality. High country thus 
developed will have a landscape character little different from much hill country 
and lowlands in New Zealand. Similarly, high country afforestation proposals 
seriously threaten the distinctive character of these landscapes. Even when 
carefully sited at the base of mountain slopes, they often disrupt the visual 
relationship between the slopes and the terraces, basin or valley floor below. 
This often separates the landscape into developed flats with the mountains 
merely a remote backdrop. It is the continuity of the landscapes that suffers 
because of these pressures". 
Fairgray (1983) however takes a different point of view. He considers that there is an 
" ... increasing awareness of the impact that different land uses can have on the 
landscape values of an area. Indeed the visual scene is primarily dependent 
upon land uses and the patterns created by superposing these uses upon, or 
relating them to, the natural pattern of the landscape. Yet forestry tends to be 
associated with continuous areas of single species plantation which are said to 
be aesthetically monotonous. This view has been influenced by the forests 
established inthe central North Island during the depression years. However, 
by proper management techniques forests can add considerably to the diversity 
of the rural landscape" (Fairgray 1983). 
As Rooney (1987) notes 
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" ... conifers are important trees ... but one of their undersirable characteristics 
is that conifers have the ability to dominate visually any landscape in which they 
are placed. Their successful use therefore demands a certain sensitivity to 
landscape value". 
However, while forestry may be able to add diversity to a high country landscape, it may 
well be that it is simplicity that is desired by some. 
However it is just as well to have regard to O'Connor's admonition with regards to high 
country afforestation, but which is applicable to other changes to the high country landscape. 
"Attitude and opinions concerning forestry in the high country landscapes would 
seem to be perhaps as varied as the landscapes themselves. Opinions range 
from strong aversion to the presence of alien conifers in what is thought to be a 
natural tussock grassland to the strong preference for grand scale tree planting as 
a positive forestry landuse. Clearly there are no universally valid prescriptions, 
and where and how trees are planted and managed may be much more important 
than whether to tolerate them at all" (O'Connor, 1986). 
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This study will focus on the conflicts that are generated by the spread of wilding conifers, as 
many of the possible changes to the HCLS mentioned above are, or can be, a consequence of 
the possible responses to this spread. 
Many introduced conifers are well adapted to a wide range of NZ conditions as evidenced by 
the widespread establishment of selfsown seedlings or wildings. Smith (1903, cited in 
Hunter and Douglas, 1984) first noted this selfspread occurring before the turn of the 
century. However it has been since the 1940's that wildling establishment has been noted as 
dramatically increasing in unimproved rangelands (Hunter and Douglas, 1984 ). This spread 
has caused concern about the uncontrolled establishment of exotic forests reducing pastoral 
productivity, and conflicting with scientific and nature conservation, landscape, and amenity 
values. (O'Connor, 1982). O'Connor has also noted that "As well as the planted forests 
there are the beginnings of extensive forests in the high country as the consequence of 
voluntary spread of seedlings from existing plantations" (O'Connor, 1986). 
The species found to spread in the high country include most conifers that have been widely 
planted there. Chavasse (1979) has outlined the occurance of the following species: Pinus 
contorta, P. pinaster, P. nigra, P. radiata, P. ponderosa, P. banksia, Larix decidua and 
Pseudotsuga menziesii. European larch and Corsican pine are considered to cause some of 
the most widespread problems in the inland areas of the South Island, where they were 
extensively planted earlier this century. While Pinus contorta has spread on many sites in 
the North Island it is not considered to be such a major problem in the South Island in terms 
of the area occupied at present. However, as Hunter and Douglas (1984) note, many 
plantings of this species are comparatively recent and the situation may change in the future. 
Indeed, Gibson (1988), who studied pine spread in North Canterbury, comments that the 
most notable feature of the P. contorta spread was the size of its contribution that has 
arisen, considering the small seed source. 
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Exotic plants have been present in the high country since last century, but high stocking rates 
helped control the spread of many plants. However with the reduction of sheep numbers the 
spread of many plants has sped up considerably and Benecke (1967) relates the increased 
spread of conifers since the 1940's and 50's to this reduction in grazing pressure. Prior to 
this reduction in grazing the rangeland had suffered severe overstocking and depletion 
(O'Connor, 1982). Many other woody weeds such as Sweet Brier (Rosa rubigosa) also 
increased dramatically at this time. In addition over this period rabbit numbers were at a low 
following the "killer policy" of 1947 (Hunter and Douglas, 1984). Hunter and Douglas 
(1984) also note that restrictions on burning of grasslands reducing conifer control by fire 
and/or an increase in the number of mature trees producing viable seed may also have 
contributed to this increase in spread in the 1950's. 
Of the accounts that have been written describing introduced conifer spread in grassland 
areas, only Benecke (1967) and Wethey (1986) provide quantitative information on the 
relationships between establishment rate, ground cover and grazing intensity. The major 
question that has arisen from their research is what levels of stocking or pasture improvement 
are necessary to suppress wilding regeneration. As Gibson (1988) notes, the difficulties in 
answering this question are many. 
A number of factors of ecology and environment contribute to the reason why conifers are 
successful in establishing themselves in the high country, with spread having been recorded 
in rainfall areas as low as 375mm (Douglas, 1970), and at altitudes up to 1220m (Ledgard, 
1980). Climate is an important aspect, as it influences conifer flowering, seed set, 
development, dispersal and germination of seed, and plant establishment The more 
extensive areas of conifer spread in NZ have occurred where there are frequent periods of 
extreme wind, and it is not uncommon for seed dispersal to take place over several 
kilometres (Hunter and Douglas, 1984). The hot dry norwest winds common to the high 
country provide perfect conditions for cone opening and seed dispersal. 
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All introduced conifers, but to a lesser extent Douglas fir, are "colonisers" establishing most 
readily in conditions of low competition for light and water (Hunter and Douglas, 1984). 
Indeed, tussocks in unimproved grassland areas appear to assist germination of conifer seeds 
by providing a low competition environment with shelter from desiccation while competition 
from introduced grasses and clovers on improved grassland is sufficient on its own to 
prevent seedling establishment (Benecke, 1967). Chavasse (1979) notes that most records 
of introduced conifers is into tussock grasslands. 
Options that can be considered in response to this propensity to spread includes control, 
erosion control, management for wood products, deliberate plantings with desirable or 
non-spreading species, agroforestry, or "do nothing". Many of these responses, by their 
very nature, overlap. There are, however, problems inherent in many of these strategies. 
While there are other methods of control such as fire, felling, and chemical spraying (see 
Wethey, 1986), Murray (1986) notes that "the most cost effective control method found to 
date appears to be grazing with sheep". Conifers are generally most vulnerable as seedlings 
to grazing by sheep or goats, whereas cattle have a lower level of grazing control compared 
to that exerted by sheep (Gibson, 1988). However where stock rates are less than one sheep 
to 1.6 ha Benecke (1967) considers that establishment of conifers is a strong possibility 
given a suitable seed source. However, in extensively grazed rangelands dispersed grazing 
tends to be selective with a great variation in grazing intensity occurring, and this may not 
coincide with areas prone to conifer establishment (O'Connor, 1978, in Hunter and Douglas, 
1984). O'Connor (1981) has also noted that the level of grazing pressure needed to 
completely control establishment of conifers may not be sustainable in many unimproved 
areas of tussock grasslands. Also to be considered is that land is moving out of agricultural 
production as noted by Taylor (1987a,b)(see below). 
The success of conifers in establishing themselves in the high country 
" ... demonstrates that most of the tussock grassland area below the upper 
subalpine zone is endowed with a climate suited to forest growth [and] it is this 
[feature of climate] which demands that we examine possible roles for forestry 
in the high country in the future" (O'Connor, 1986). 
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These roles include the management of either planted or wilding forests for timber, pulp, or 
possibly as a biomass source for liquid fuel production. Agroforestry is another possible 
strategy, while the "do nothing" option has been suggested also. 
Ledgard and Belton (1985b) have shown that there is a considerable potential for forestry 
development in the high country. For areas that are "at risk" from wilding spread it has been 
suggested that these areas can be planted (and managed) with species not likely to spread. 
However Jamieson's (1974) assessment of P. contorta wildings from Kariori forest (in the 
central North Island) concluded that 
"silvicultural treatment of regenerated contorta pine stands at fairly high altitudes 
is feasible and not costly, that response in terms of increased diameter growth is 
good and that stands can be brought into a uniform condition approaching 
plantations of the same mean height" (Jamieson, 1974). 
For prospective uses of high country production forestry see: Nordmeyer (1979), Ledgard 
and Belton (1985a, 1985b), and Ledgard and Baker (1982). 
"Another area of interest is in the production of liquid fuel" (Ledgard and Baker, 1982). As 
Hayward and O'Connor (1981) note 
"In the absence of positive management [to control teh spread of conifers], we 
should expect that within the next 100 years many tussock grasslands will 
become open or even dense coniferous forests, as has already occurred on the 
Waiouru plateau. As these forests may have a significent role in future 
production of liquid fuels, such change may have real economic advantages". 
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The "do nothing" option which has been suggested, is to leave the development of wilding 
forests, through natural succession, to return to natural bush. It is not considered applicable 
other than in areas where suitable indigenous seed source is present and it is desired to allow 
the land to return to bush (Gibson, 1988). "If disused pine or oak forests give way to beech 
in a thousand years, it will be some thousand years before beech would arrive on its own" 
(O'Connor, 1986). Burrows (pers. comm.) disputes this, noting that the ecology of pines 
would lead to self-perpetuation through periodic wildfire. It is also a very long term 
approach. However Hunter and Douglas (1984) consider that wilding stands which do not 
bear the "harsh outline and uniformity of planted stands" could "enhance landcape and 
recreation values". A related strategy is the use of introduced conifers, in particular P. 
contorta, for erosion control (Hunter and Douglas, 1984). However there is a dubious 
connection between afforestation and erosion rates (McSaveney and Whitehouse 1986). 
O'Connor (1986) reviews forestry and its possible roles with agriculture in the SI high 
country, and agroforestry options appear to have an important future agricultural role 
(Gibson, 1988). Of considerable significance is the build up in phosporus levels under 
. conifer stands (Ledgard and Belton, 1985, O'Connor, 1986). Advantages of agro-forestry 
include: short term cash return, better nutrient utilisation, longer rotation trees crops and 
utilisation of land with low feed production (Gibson, 1988). 
Gibson (1988) proposes a control strategy to prevent further spread that 
" ... consists essentially of delimiting a containment zone, destruction of trees 
beyond this limit, and regular checks and destruction of establishing trees. 
Further improvement on the basic strategy is possible by grazing management 
and land improvement beyond the containment zone. There is good potential for 
agro-forestry options within the containment zone. Re-establishing pastoralism 
in afforested areas would require destruction and removal of the trees. The 
consequent land disturbance would provide ideal conditions for trees to 
re-establish. A follow up programme of top dressing and oversowing would be 
necessary, and preferally sheep and/or goat only management to prevent 
conifers re-establishing" (Gibson, 1988). 
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However with most of these options the tussock grassland landscape values would be lost. 
O'Connor (1986) recognises " ... that nature conservation of tussock in potentially forested 
country, demands improved pasture management as buffer zones to control wilding spread." 
Swaffield and O'Connor (1986) comment that 
"Clearly there are prospects that positive integration between different land uses 
and conservation may be [desired] in some of the lower altitude terrains. Short 
tussock grasslands are, in the main, induced vegetation. As such they are part 
of our cultural heritage, requiring grazing to maintain their present 
physiognomy. There are other areas which, as wetlands or tall tussock 
grasslands, require protection against intensive grazing use or development of 
any kind if they are to be maintained in those formations. There is increasing 
concern that tussock grasslands may be occupied by exotic conifers. While this 
is a real threat, it is believed by some that "natural" tussock grasslands, 
themselves induced from forest by fire, should be protected universally from the 
planting or ingress of conifers and from pasture improvement. What is not 
understood by such people is that sufficient conifers already exist in the tussock 
grasslands to take them over by natural spread, if the unimproved grasslands are 
not protected by zones of intensive grazing management, feasible only on 
developed grasslands. As pointed out by O'Connor (1983, 1986) the 
interdependence of each use is a design imperitive". 
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While the interdependence of unimproved grasslands and developed grassland may be a 
design imperitive, it is an expensive undertaking to "improve" grassland. As Taylor (1987a, 
1987b) notes with a surplus of world agricultural production along with improved 
efficiencies " ... fewer hectares will be needed to provide the food and fibre for the world's 
needs. Thus land currently in agricultural production may move out to other uses, e.g. 
amenity, tourism, recreation or simply 'set aside'." As a consequence the financial 
incentives to develop buffer zones in marginal areas are reduced, along with a concomitant 
decline in grazing pressure, thus resulting in more exotics to establishing themselves and a 
continuing reduction in 'natural' tussock grasslands. So the question is "How much do we 
as a nation want to (or can afford to) conserve or preserve"? It is because of this that we 
need to know what the values placed on the tussock grasslands are, if we are to make 
effective and efficient decisions about the landscape, using the limited resources that we have 
available to us. As Kelly and Park (1986) note that the Protected Natural Areas Programme 
is based on 
" ... a process of systematic assessment and ranking, determining which are the 
best, or most representative, examples. There is widespread fear in 
conservation circles that selection or "ranking" procedures tend to focus on the 
few best natural areas, and cast aside the rest as unimportant. We believe this 
fear to be a real one .... however, the pressure of market forces require a 
selection to be made. The fact does remain that at times one place only must be 
chosen, for reason of available finance, or time .... ultimately society requires 
a final judgement to be made as to which alternative is 'best'." 
The question that remains though is "How much finance should we make available?", as we 
can not 'preserve' all of it. So should we allocate more or less resources and by how much 
(to be economically efficient), and indeed, is intervention warranted? Alternatively, the 
question could be asked as to how much of the high country do we want to see afforested. 
However it is considered more appropriate to deal with changes to the status quo, hence the 
question of "How much do we want to preserve?" 
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Reasons for wanting to conserve and preserve a representative portion of the high country 
landscape include links with our past, the limited representation in present reserves, and the 
related requirements of the Reserves and Conservation Acts. 
Lucas (1987) has commented that 
"Change has always been a feature of tussock grassland areas. When in tussock 
grasslands, we can marvel at the processes that created the landforms, and often 
the immense change from forest and shrubland caused by the earliest 
inhabitants. The grasslands will, because of their ecology or our intervention, 
continue to change. We need to ensure that they can do this without losing their 
meaning for our past." 
Indeed Kelly and Park (1986) note," ... widespread oversowing or cultivation is 
transforming these tussocklands into anonymous hill country". Lucas (1987) also asserts 
that "The high country is special to us all, not just in terms of production or recreation. 
Somehow we all recognise it as a significant part of our natural heritage, even ... [to] many 
of those not fortunate to live or work in, or visit it". In addition Kelly and Park (1986) note 
that "New Zealand relies heavily on the distinctive quality of its landscape and natural 
environment for its tourist industry. Native vegetation, flora, and fauna establish the 
character of much of the sought-after landscape". 
Kelly and Park (1986) consider that " ... many important classes of land are poorly 
represented in protected areas. In many parts of the country, with their own particular 
character, there are simply no protected areas". For example, up until1980 only nine 
hectares of short tussock grassland in Otago was protected in scenic reserves (McSweeney 
and Molloy, 1984). [See also O'Connor (1983)]. Compounded with this, Kelly and Park 
(1986) consider that "The rate of change in the lowlands and some montane country of is 
now so rapid that areas not identified for protection now will probably have disappeared in 
ten years", which is a sentiment echoed from Molloy et al. (1980). 
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Related to this are the requirements of the Reserves Act 1977 and the Conservation Act 1987 
with regards] to the landscape. Section 3(b) of the Reserves Act 1977 requires 
"Ensuring, as far as possible, the survival of all indigenous species of flora and 
fauna, both rare and commonplace, in their natural communities and habitats, 
and preservation of representative samples of all classes of ecosystems and 
landscapes which in the aggregate originally gave New Zealand its own 
recognisable character:", 
while the Conservation Act 1987 is "An Act to promote the conservation of New Zealand's 
natural and historic resources .... " which includes landscape and landform. 
The primary concern of the Reserves Act is with "natural ecosystems and landscapes". Kelly 
and Park (1986) however note that 
"In practice, most sites have been modified to a greater or lesser degree. It is 
however most important to note that fire-induced and secondary communities 
may still be completely natural, in terms of their species composition and 
ecosystem processes. Natural does not mean static. From a visual landscape 
point of view, naturalness essentially means the original form and contour of the 
land are unbroken. We cannot escape the fact that some of the most appealing 
landscapes in the country are a mosaic of the indigenous and the transformed, 
on an undisturbed contour. Intermontane Canterbury and Otago ... Banks 
Peninsula ... provide numerous examples . . . . " 
With 'insensitive' developments it is the continuity of the landscapes that suffers (Lucas, 
1987). "We need overall harmony- but that does not mean no development. Often 
development can be carefully contained within a tussock landscape, depending on how it is 
sited, designed and managed" (ibid.). Hayward and O'Connor (1981) stressed to" ... 
landscape architects that they were not in a preserving role so much as a protecting, 
discriminating and directing role, because of the changing nature of 'natural landscapes"' 
(Swaffield and O'Connor, 1986). Indeed O'Connor (1986) has confidence " ... that 
creative forestry has a genuine future in economic, aesthetic and responsible cultural 
landscape .... " However as noted by Rooney (1987) "Their successful use therefore 
demands a certain sensitivity to landscape value". 
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However the range of values, and the threats to the values of tussock grasslands,according 
to Lucas (1987), have seldom been acknowledged in planning, development or management 
strategies. Ashdown and Lucas (1987) stress the need to recognize not just the"special" 
landscapes, but also the "typical" as essential in the overall distinctive regional character. 
"This factor needs to be considered when assessing each and every development proposal or 
land management intensification which may have an immediate or eventual impact on a 
tussock grassland landscape" (ibid.). However with regard to wilding spread 
"In the absence of positive management, we should expect that within the next 
100 years many tussock grasslands will become open or even dense coniferous 
forests . . . . The challenge, however, is to recognise that the process of such 
change has already been set in train and therefore to develop positive 
management strategies where we believe that landscapes would be degraded by 
afforestation" (Hayward and O'Connor, 1981). 
Conflicts and compromises are inevitable in making decisions; to make better decisions 
information on the various aspects of what is affected is needed. Landscape values are but 
just one (often overlooked) aspect of what needs to be considered when making a decision. 
However people may prefer these changes, such as tree planting or spread, over-sown and 
top-dressed pasture, etc. For example Hunter and Douglas (1984) consider that wilding 
stands which do not bear the "harsh outline and uniformity of planted stands" could "enhance 
landscape and recreation values". As O'Connor (1986) has noted 
"Attitude and opinions concerning forestry in the high country landscapes would 
seem to be perhaps as varied as the landscapes themselves. Opinions range 
from strong aversion to the presence of alien conifers in what is thought to be a 
natural tussock grassland to the strong preference for grand scale tree planting as 
a positive forestry landuse." 
It is however important to keep in mind Price's (1978) comments that 
"Absolute protection, with management specifically for landscape purposes, 
could and should be given to a selection of elite landscapes of all types. It is 
preferable that they should be enclaves within areas where protection of some 
stringency is also applied, so that detrimental effects along the boundary are 
reduced. In this way the best of both natural features and man-made landscape 
should be retained, at least until such time as it is demonstrably not valuable 
enough to justify its costs." 
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Other values in addition to landscape values, such as scientific/ecological, agricultural, water 
and soil values, along with agricultural and finacial considerations, also have to be weighed 
also in the decision making process and subsequent management strategies. If managers are 
to allocate resources optimally between these different values, they must be aware, not only 
of the use levels of the different user groups, but also have some idea of the relative value 
that each competing use has to the nation. When one is in conflict with another it is not 
sufficient for decision makers to decide that one use will be regarded as more important than 
any other. If allocation of resoures is to be optimal decision makers should seek to trade off 
uses according to their relative values to society. 
"The introduction of forestry [or any other major change] into the high country 
will involve the consideration ofnon-market costs and benefits, particularly in 
such areas as landscape, ecological and social impacts. These can only be 
accounted for by seeking the subjective valuation of their relative worth from the 
local and regional communities in deciding trade-offs between various land use 
options" (Murray, 1986). 
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As a consequence we need to consider the applicability of the various non-market valuation 
techniques for ascertaining these values, so as to help in answering some of the questions 
that have been posed above. 
20 
CHAPTER 3: A RATIONALE 
"Landscape as a commodity is publicly viewed from outside the boundaries of the physical 
landscape. Its value is substantially affected by private and public action. To reach rational 
decisions about whether actions should be undertaken or permitted, it is desirable that this 
externality should be considered and quantified. [However] No intuitive appreciation of the 
desirabilty of ane course of action can properly reflect the wishes of the public. The 
decision-maker must become analytical if he wishes to make good decisions, and he needs a 
system of evaluation to help him. Either some trade-off has to be made between landscape 
and other values, or beauty has to be treated as truly sacred, and all detriment to landscape 
prohibited." (Price, 1978). 
A rational method for assessing what the social welfare consequences (ie. social costs and 
benefits) of actions in determining how trade-offs are to be made is Benefit Cost Analysis 
(BCA). BCA uses market and assigned prices as a basis for deriving measures of social 
welfare. However, public goods, by their very nature are unpriced by market activities and 
as noted by Price (1978) "Landscape is a classic public good: it is difficult for its owners to 
exclude the public from consumption of it; and the product is not used up in the process of 
consumption." 
To estimate values ofunpriced goods and services for BCA (either formally or informally) 
non-market valuation techniques are used which thereby allow decisions to be made 
(hopefully) in a total valuational context. There are a number of techniques for estimating 
non-market values and these are reviewed below. However, before this is done the concepts 
of social welfare and BCA will be briefly reviewed. 
BCA is a technique which attempts to set out and evaluate the social costs and benefits of 
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actions or activities. The aim is to identify and measure the losses and gains in social welfare 
which are incurred by society as a whole if a particular action occurs (Bannock et al., 1972). 
Social Welfare is considered as the wellbeing of the community considered as a whole and is 
an aggregation of the preferences of individuals within society (ibid.). Social Welfare is a 
utilitarian concept and is based on an economic model of Egoistic Man, where the definition 
of economic value is derived from a preference structure called indifference. This is where 
an individual is indifferent between amounts and assortments of things that provide equal 
satisfaction or utility (Edwards, 1987). Utility is defmed as" ... the satisfaction of a human 
want or desire (and) this is virtually synonymous with a capacity to make a favourable 
difference to someone's life" (Sinden and Worrell, 1979). 
"(I)f economic man's income increases, so will personal utility, since. more 
money is available to increase the amounts of things that provide personal 
satisfaction. [However] if something changes to reduce the availability, 
amount, or quality of something that provides instrumental value, what is the 
maximum that the person is willing to pay to prevent the change? Notice that the 
change . . . would lower utility for economic man, and that maximum 
willingness - to - pay is the reduction in income that prevents the change. That 
is, maximum willingness-to-pay is the change in income that holds personal 
utility constant" (Edwards, 1987). 
Consequently as Edwards (1987) notes 
" ... the cold truth is that there is nothing unique about an apple, a day of 
fishing, a scenic vista, a blue whale, or a bequest of clean ground water to 
future generations. Economic man trades these off at the margin to identify 
positions of equal personal satisfaction." 
Price (1978) also notes that: "The cost-benefit analyst strives to encompass such disparate 
additions [of apples and elephants] by summing, not the things themselves, but their power 
to impart welfare, or benefit, or satisfaction, or utility." 
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The main objective of natural resource management policy in NZ is efficiency in resource use 
so as to maximise net social benefits according to Piddington (1987). As Freeman (1979) 
comments 
" ... if the objective of environmental management is to maximise the efficiency 
of the use of resources .... then benefit-cost analysis becomes, in effect, a set 
of rules for optimum environmental management and a set of definitions and 
procedures for measuring benefits and costs". 
Merkhoffer (1987) considers BCA " ... in essence a pragmatic methodology for determining 
whether a proposed change in the use of resources will improve efficiency." 
The efficiency criterion underlying benefit cost theory is also known as a criterion of 
"potential Pareto optimality", and this means that " ... a decision is an improvement if those 
who are better off could potentially share some of their gains with those who are worse off. 
It does not, however, require that such compensation actually be made" (Merk:hofer, 1987). 
It is this concept that underlies the social welfare criterion for ranking and/or assessing the 
consequences of social actions in BCA (Cummings et al., 1986). 
"The compensation test in turn forms the theoretical foundation for cost-benefit 
analysis .... the benefits of a proposed policy or project are defined in theory 
as the maximum amount that gainers would be willing to pay in compensation to 
losers. Theoretically, costs are the minimum amount required to compensate all 
losers fully." (Bishop, 1985). 
In order to make decisions about resource use that will increase efficiency and improve social 
welfare (or at least do not diminish it) requires information on how market and non-market 
values would be affected by the alternative options. To do this the various types of benefits 
(and costs) have to be in a common unit of account so as to allow aggregation, and it must be 
possible to compare benefits with costs in a meaningful way (Sharp, 1987). According to 
Fisher et al. (1987) "BCA is the only technique that attempts to compare in commensurate 
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terms the positve outcomes (benefits) with the negative outcomes (costs) of regulation." A 
commensurate measure of value is the dollar. Indeed, due to the nature of BCA it is the only 
suitable metric available, as noted by Sinden and Worrell (1979): 
"The only clear case in which a monetary value is necessary is when both 
benefits and costs can vary and the decision criterion must be to maximise net 
benefits. Because different kinds of benefits and costs cannot be added or 
compare-d directly, it is necessary to measure all in a common unit." 
As Edwards (1987) notes: 
"Dollars, or more accurately changes in income, are convenient and legitimate 
proxies for the change in commodities that leave economic man indifferent 
between initial and final conditions." 
Edwards further notes that 
" ... if man's preferences are selfish and structured by indifference, then 
economic value is well-defined and measured appropriately in monetary terms. 
This simple abstraction of man is powerful in the sense that it yields testable 
hypotheses about willingness-to-pay." 
In its simplest format BCA directly uses existing prices to impute values. However 
"for many ... decisions ... actions ... produce substantial changes in the 
market, and these impacts must be taken into account when using market prices 
[which require] a more complex analysis involving concepts of consumers and 
producers surplus" (Merkhofer, 1987). 
To do this the demand curve is needed to be known. Once this has been derived the 
consumer surplus can be determined and this is the summed differences between the 
willingness-to-pay and the price paid for that good. From this the total benefit derived from 
that good/servive is obtained. 
"Impicitly, market prices are appropriate measures of the 'benefits' (social 
welfare) of concern in BCA .... [and] it is ... assumed that market prices for 
outputs and inputs serve, at least as a first approximation, as proper measures of 
socially relevant benefits and costs" (Cumming~ et al., 1986). 
However 
" . markets and prices are not necessary conditions for economic value. 
Rather, markets and prices emerge from collective economic behavior when 
people can be excluded from the use and benefits of things unless they pay [or 
exchange something else] for them. Property rights protect owners' claims to 
things while prices facilitate an allocation of their claims. Without exclusivity on 
the supply side and a sufficient interest or demand on the part of others to pay 
for something, markets and prices would not emerge. Contrast things that are 
exchanged in markets with scenic vistas, clean ground water, national forests, 
and blue whales. Although the latter are usually are not priced in traditional 
single-commodity markets, economic man still gets personal satisfaction from 
their existence." (Edwards, 1987). 
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"Many problems are complicated by the presence of things that have not been bought and 
sold in markets and are therefore unpriced. [However decisions that need to be made] are 
still basically economic, because they arise from competing demands for scarce resources" 
(Sinden and Worrell, 1979). Consequently, "In the absence of a market price, values must 
necessarily be imputed to the flows of benefits .... " (Sharp, 1987) if a comparision with 
alternative uses is to be made. With regards to the high country landscape the task is " ... to 
assign a monetary equivalent to the change in aesthetic values consequent on a given change 
in the physical composition of a given landscape" (Price, 1978), and "Since the 
compensation test [which forms the theoretical foundation for BCA] emphasises society as a 
whole, the goal must be to measure all the values held by all members of society" (Bishop, 
1985). 
Before the various facets or concepts that non-market value is composed of are described, 
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two aspects of the word "value" need to be defined in order to reduce confusion. What are 
values, and also, where do they reside? One aspect of the word value relates to "the moral 
principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group" (Hanks, 1979). 
Rokeach suggests that " A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or 
end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence (Rokeach, 1973, quoted in Stewart, 1983). Another aspect 
of the word "value" relates to:· ... the desirability of a thing, often in respect of some 
property such as usefulness or exchangeability: worth, merit, importance" (Hanks, 1979), or 
"The total utility which is yielded by the object in question [while] utility [is] the satisfaction, 
pleasure or need-fulfilment derived from consuming some quantity of good" (Bannock et al., 
1972). As such the value of a thing (be it private or public good, real or metaphysical) is a 
property of, and resides with the consumer, observer or believer. As such intrinsic values 
(ie. a value an object has [to its self] independant of any observers) are not considered in this 
schema except in as much that this provides utility to those who believe in its existence. This 
concept of value is synonymous with the idea of utility and it is this aspect of value that this 
study will be considering. 
The utility derived from something is a combination of both market and non-market values. 
Market values can be observed directly. With regards to the high country there is a market 
value of the land which is related to its (perceived) productivity from animals, trees or 
tourists. Because the market is not "perfect" not all the utility derived from consuming a 
good or service is directly expressed in dollar values. As Price (1978) notes: 
"Unfortunately, because landscape is a public good, consumers seldom exhibit directly a 
willingness to pay for it." The portion of the social value of a good that is not expressed in 
market values as dollars is known, not unsurprisingly, as non-market value, and is 
comprised of Instrumental, Option, Quasi-option and Existence values. These are: 
Instrumental Value: "This is the value of present and expected use of a resource .... " 
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(Kerr, 1986). An example is the utility derived from viewing mountain scenery. The value 
of a good can sometimes be indicated where there is say an entrance fee to a scenic area. 
However no indication of consumer surplus or the total utility derived is given. 
Option Value: " ... is the value of an option that keeps available the possible future use of a 
resource, apart from the value of using the resource" (Talhelm, 1983). Where uncertainty 
exists with regard to the use of a resource, there is a risk that future use options will be 
foreclosed. Option value is a measure of the utility derived from insuring that future options 
remain open. 
Quasi-option Value: This is the utility that may be obtained sometime in the future through 
improved knowledge about a resource, but could be foreclosed by irreversible changes 
through using the good/resource now. However, "since we do not know these future 
outcomes now, quasi-option value cannot be estimated" (Kerr, 1986). 
Existence Value: This is the utility that is derived from the the knowledge that something 
exists, without any direct or intented use of it. 
"The unifying characteristic of these values and their definitions in the economics literature is 
that their assignment is based solely on personal utility and indifference." (Edwards, 1987). 
However" ... it is usually unnecessary to isolate value components in economic analyses of 
environmental policies which require only information on total value (i.e., option price)" 
(ibid.). 
There are a number of various methods available to determine non-market values. Methods 
that are discussed are: Travel Cost, Implicit or Hedonic Price, Indifference Curve Mapping, 
and Contingent. 
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Travel Cost Method 
The travel cost method was originally developed for valuing outdoor recreation (Sinden and 
Worrell, 1979) and its central theme is that the amount of use a site receives is dependent on 
the associated costs of using that site. For free access public recreation sites this cost is 
usually equated to costs of tra\fel (Kerr, 1986). Because costs of travel influence the number 
of visits (Sinden and Worrell, 1979) the value of the site can be derived. While it is a 
relatively easily applied means of assessing site values (Kerr, 1987), it assumes that all 
benefits are derived from visits (Sinden and Worrell, 1979). Also, the value derived is only 
attributable to the resource in its present state (Kerr, 1986). According to Sinden and 
Worrell (1979) because of assumptions in the method, it is limited to estimating minimum 
values and comparative values of similar things. Consequently it is not considered suitable 
for estimating the value of the high country landscape. In addition, the high country 
landscape is not so much a destination site, but a part of the journey. 
Implicit or Hedonic Price Method 
The hedonic price method is a market based valuational approach (Kerr, 1986; Fisher, 
1987). Goods exchanged in markets have a price which is a reflection of the sum of various 
attributes or characteristics which make that good up. By holding all factors and attributes 
constant except one it is possible to estimate the marginal value of that (environmental) 
attribute. To use this method a "well-behaved market for the good containing the relevant 
environmental attribute" is required along with an informed public (Kerr, 1986). Fisher 
(1987) however considers that the assumption/requirement of full information would be 
unrealistic in many cases. High transaction costs and indivisibility of some attributes may 
also invalidate the former requirement (Kerr, 1986). Another limitation is that it does or can 
not incorporate values held by people towards an (environmental) attribute who do not 
participate in the market for the good that contains that attribute. While this method can be 
useful in determining values for environmental attributes through the property market, 
because many/most people who hold values about the high country landscape do not 
participate in the market for high country properties it is considered that this is an 
inappropriate method. In addition this market is probably too small, and landscape only a 
minor factor for those who do participate, for statistically valid conclusions to be drawn. 
Indifference Curve Mapping 
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This method attempts to map indifference curves of individuals - that is: the combinations of 
goods and services that have equal utility or satisfaction. Demand curves can then be derived 
and thence consumer surplus (Kerr, 1986), from which total benefit is determined. While 
this approach is intuitively appealing (Bennet, 1987) there are a number of problems with 
implementing the method, along with concerns over certain assumptions such as additivity of 
utility (ibid). The method is expensive to use (ibid; Kerr, 1986), long (taking up to two 
hours per interview), and complicated (as the concept of probaility needs to be understood). 
Because "these practical difficulties negate the methods usefulness for most situations" 
(Kerr, 1986), this approach is also considered inappropriate for valuing the high country 
landscape. 
Contingent Valuation Method 
The contingent valuation method is based on setting up a hypothetical market for an unpriced 
good and individuals are asked directly either how much they would be willing to pay, or 
accept as compensation for proposed changes to that good (or service). Approaches that may 
be taken are: open-ended questions, dichotomous choice, iterative bidding, payment card 
formats, and contingent ranking techniques (Bishop and Heberlien, 1987). Analysis of 
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results ranges from fairly straight forward, through to the application of difficult 
econometrics techniques (ibid). The method has limitations (such as the willingness and 
ability of repondents to value the good or service (ibid) and is criticised because of a number 
of potential biases (ibid; Kerr, 1986). Because "All other methods of valuing publicly 
provided goods and services ... require some rather direct link to actual market transactions 
.... [and] no such link ... is required for contigent valuation [and] most environmental 
assets lie outside the market system" (Bishop and Heberlien, 1987) it is considered that the 
contingent valuation method could be appropriate for determining the non-market values of 
the high country landscape. 
In this chapter the concepts involved in, or with, BCA such as social welfare, utility , and 
economic efficiency have been reviewed. If these are accepted then consequently is a need to 
know non-market values which are in commensurate terms with market values. Various 
methods that value non-market goods in dollar terms were considered. The contingent 
valuation method was adjudged to be the most appropriate. It will be assessed in further 
detail in the following chapter where its applicability for determining the non-market values 
of the high country landscape will be considered. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSMENT 
The task: " ... to assign a monetary equivalent to the change in aesthetic values consequent 
on a given change in the physical composition of a given landscape" (Price, 1978 ). 
"There is, of course, a barrier ofunfamiliarty about judgements on the cash value of 
landscape. Yet they are not really different from, nor more difficult than, judgements on the 
worth of marketable goods. Anyone who can answer the question, 'What would I pay for a 
jam doughnut?' can be trained to answer the question, 'What would I pay for an attractive 
view?' The case ofthejam doughnut is initially simpler because the answer can be 
discovered by trial and error, the decision-maker having been confronted by the priced article 
on numerous occasions. But the same process can be applied in an hypothetical way to 
landscape. When 'a halfpenny' and 'a million pounds' have been eliminated as possible 
answers, it is merely a matter of narrowing the choice down. Where, as normal, evaluation 
is required of landscape in different states, the decision may be likened to a choice between 
jam doughnuts and cream doughnuts, to which different prices are attached. If the change is 
represented as from jam to the (say) higher state of cream, willingness to pay for the change 
is technically appropriate; if from cream to jam, the required compensation for giving up the 
cream. Of course, some people prefer jam doughnuts to cream; so it is with the two states of 
a landscape" (Price, 1978). 
Before the contingent valuation method (CVM) is reviewed in this chapter, the nature of 
assessing landscapes is considered. The biases that are posited to occur, and various other 
problems that have been raised about the method are then reviewed and in the light of these 
the CVM will be assessed as to whether it is applicable for placing values on the high country 
landscape. 
The evaluation of landscapes is largely a subjective process, as aesthetic preferences are 
determined by individual tastes (Fairgray, 1983; Murray, 1986; Kelly and Park, 1986; 
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Ulrich, 1986; Jackman, 1986). "It is emotional, subjective, and the result of conditioning" 
according to Fairgray (1986). As Kelly and Park (1986) comment, the assessment of the 
visual attributes of a landscape 
" ... is inherently difficult, since the character or quality of the landscape 
recognised or valued in any area is essentially an individual perception, and may 
embrace indigenous, modified, rural, or even urban lands, as well as water, 
landform features, and places devoid of vegetation. Sometimes it is the 
juxtaposition or mingling of two or more quite different features which 
characterise 'the landscape' for the viewer." 
Because the opinions that make up the values attached to the landscape are diverse 
(Piddington et al., 1985) it is not surprising to find controversy over what makes up a 'good' 
landscape. "That which is an outrage to one person may be perfectly acceptable to another" 
(Fairgray, 1983). As O'Connor (1986) notes, 
"Attitude and opinions concerning forestry in the high country landscapes would 
seem to be perhaps as varied as the landscapes themselves. Opinions range 
from strong aversion to the presence of alien conifers in what is thought to be a 
natural tussock grassland to the strong preference for grand scale tree planting as 
a positive forestry landuse." 
With regards to the attitudes attached to the high country landscape by visitors there is little 
information about the attitudes about tree planting. There is however a small unpublished 
survey of winter visitors to the Mackenzie that was done by Pauline Gibbons (O'Connor, 
1986). Although openess and grand scale were frequently identified as attractive features of 
the Mackenzie, the apparent barrenness was sometimes considered as unattractive. However 
most visitors considered that tree planting and irrigated land development would enhance the 
scene. This finding is in concordance with the observations of Ulrich (1986) who notes that 
"Findings from several studies indicate that high-preference views can frequenty 
be described as park-like or savanna-like in appearance. Hence, preferred 
unspectacular landscapes are comparatively ordered, 'civilised' assemblages of 
natural elements; most are not wild in terms of conveying a sense that human 
influences are absent. There is little question that urban parks characterised by 
smooth ground covers, scattered trees, and depth or openess, are visual 
approximates of a general class of natural landscapes that are highly preferred 
relative to many, if not most, other natural scenes." 
While attitudes and opinions may be varied, Fairgray (1983) considers that there is 
" ... common agreement on many aspects of what is visually acceptable and 
what is not. An understanding and identification of these areas of common 
agreement provides a means by which the ... landscape may be managed to 
preserve the quality of the visual environment as it is assessed by the majority of 
the people." 
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An aspect of the visual environment in natural settings is the presence of man-made features 
and Ulrich (1986) notes that some investigations have found that these can have strong 
negative effects on liking. 
"However . . . there is no simple general relationship between aesthetic 
responses and the presence of built features in natural settings .... [and] liking 
is less influenced by the number or extent of man-made features than by the 
degree of 'fittingness' or compatibility between the elements and their 
surroundings. Fittingness refers to the perceived harmony or integration 
between a feature and its natural background. Low fittingness, or 
obtrusiveness, is produced by properties such as large element size, low 
congruity of shape, and high color contrast" (Ulrich, 1986). 
Exotic plantations in the high country (especially on slopes) could exhibit most if not all of 
these characteristics if not carefully planned. However as O'Connor (1986) has commented: 
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"Clearly there are no universally valid prescriptions, and where and how trees are planted 
and managed may be much more important than whether to tolerate them at all." As Fair gray 
(1983) has noted," ... by proper management techniques forests can add considerably to the 
diversity of the rural landscape." Nevertheless there is no consistent approach to tackling the 
question of assessing the visual attributes of natural areas to yet emerge in New Zealand 
(Kelly and Park, 1986). According to O'Connor 
"This question of land perception and discernment and valuing of 'quality' 
warrants careful research." However, whatever the type and range of attitudes 
existing about the landscape, there should be, as Price (1978) notes, "Absolute 
protection, with management specifically for landscape purposes ... given to a 
selection of elite landscapes of all types. It is preferable that they should be 
enclaves within areas where protection of some stringency is also applied, so 
that detrimental effects along the boundary are reduced. In this way the best of 
both natural features and man-made landscape should be retained, at least until 
such time as it is demonstrably not valuable enough to justify its costs." 
The question though is "How much should we preserve to be efficient in the allocation of our 
limited resources?" and "Can CVM help us in answering this?" 
Having reviewed briefly the problems of defining what the landscape is, the CVM will be 
reviewed before assessing its applicability for valuing the high country landscape. 
"Contingent valuation devices involve asking individuals, in survey or 
experimental settings, to reveal their personal valuations of increments (or 
decrements) in unpriced goods by using contingent markets. These markets 
define the good or amenity of interest, the status quo level of provision and the 
offered increment or decrement therein, the institutional structure under which 
the good is to be provided, the method of payment, and (implicitly or explicity) 
the decision rule which determines whether to implement the offered program. 
Contingent markets are highly structured, to confront respondents with a 
well-defined situation and to elicit a circumstantial choice contingent upon the 
occurence of the posited situation. Contingent markets elicit contingent choices" 
(Randall et al., 1983). 
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Cummings et al. (1986) consider" ... that the iterative bidding process must be used in 
contingent valuation method (CVM) applications if meaningful measures of subjects' 
maximum willingness to pay are to be derived." With regard to landscapes Price (1978) 
considers that the relevant population is all those who might be aware of the sites existence, 
so therefore there is the need to sample whole country. 
Evidence of several kinds from a number of studies support the validity of CVMs according 
to Randell et al. (1983). They consider that 
". . . CV bids are not random numbers. Many empirical studies show that 
individual or household bids are significantly related to income, availability of 
substitute and complementary goods and demographic characteristics. Basic 
data are disaggregate ... cross-sectional in nature, and typically generated from 
small samples. Considering the nature of this data, the proportion of total 
variation in bid usually explained compares with that in similar cross-sectional 
data sets. CV results are not only systematic, but are consistent with various 
types of actual behavior. At the most elementary level, individuals are willing to 
pay positive amounts in contingent markets for amenities that (their behavior 
shows) they prefer" (Randall et al., 1983). 
They also note a considerable number of comparisions that have been undertaken that have 
resulted in consistent valuations with alternative methods. According to Rahmatian (1986) 
the comparabilty of the contingent valuation technique with other, more traditional, 
techniques has given substantial credibility to the survey techniques. The credibility of the 
CV approach is based upon the stability of bids offered for a non-market good. Stability 
depends on the extent to which the respondents are induced to research their preferences. 
The depth of respondents's research into his/her preferences depends on two critical factors: 
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(1) how well the non-market good is specified; and (2) the quality of the survey design. 
However because the CVM technique is based on personal valuations of goods that are 
inherently difficult to subject to interpersonal validation, there are suspicions that misstated 
valuations may be prevalent. However alternative methods are themselves subject to 
limitations. This realisation is essential to a balanced evaluation of CVM, as comparisions 
are between techniques which are all imperfect, but in different ways. (Randall, 1983; Seller 
et al., 1985). 
Sources of potential error in CVM include hypothetical, strategic, instrument, information, 
and starting point biases (Kerr, 1986; Brookshire, Ives and Schulze, 1976; Rowe, d'Arge, 
and Brookshire, 1980; Thayer, 1981). 
Hypothetical bias is raised as a problem as respondents could casually bid any amount 
without weighing the opportunity costs implicit in their bids (Bishop and Heberlien, 1979), 
because of the hypothetical nature of the payment. Experimental fmdings supports the notion 
that some kinds of questions result in 'truer' responses that others. Of the various 
'attitudinal' questioning approaches, contingent choice questions appear to work best ( 
Randall, 1983). According to Cummings et al. (1986) 
" ... at worst, evidence from research to date provides equivocal resullts 
concerning the hypothetical payment issue; at best, for public goods which 
satisfy the ROC's, evidence from comparative and experimental studies 
suggests that minimal biases in CVM measures may result from hypothetical 
payment." 
Significantly, Cummings et al. (1986) consider the most prominent source of bias arises 
" ... where the CVM commodity, within a contingent exchange setting, is largely unfamiliar 
to the subject - the subject has no experience in viewing the commodity within the context of 
tradeoffs." The implications of this are discussed in further detail below. 
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Strategic bias occurs when individuals attempt to maximise their own welfare by 
misrepresenting there real preference so as to influence the mean bid. Smith (1980, cited in 
Randall et al., 1983) " .. .found that as incentives for strategic behavior became stronger and 
subjects became more familiar with the experimental format, the incidence of strategic 
behavior increased somewhat." 
Instrument or Vehicle Bias is where the method for collecting or paying for the bid influences 
the bid (Kerr, 1986). However it has been suggested that 
" ... the social arrangements by which payments are made - the payment vehicle 
- is an integral part of the CVM commodity per se, i.e., one cannot seperate the 
value of the commodity from the procedures by which the commodity is 
provided and payment is made. These arguments have . . . important 
implications for the design and interpretation of results from CVM . . . . 
reflecting the fact that our commodity is not a market commodity, but a 
commodity which can only result from social action (government intervention) 
.... " (Cummings et al., 1986). 
Information Bias occurs where the amount of information provided about the implications of 
the proposed changes affects the bid (Kerr, 1986). "[A]n integral part of pre-tests of 
questionnaires must be the effort to balance the subject's need for information with his/her 
general capacity to absorb- process- the information" (Cummings et al., 1986). 
Starting point bias is said to occur where the starting bid in iterative applications affects the 
final outcome. According to Cummings et al. (1986) the 
" ... use of a payment card does not eliminate the problem inasmuch as value 
ranges on the bidding card provide the potential for 'entering biases' (indications 
of 'reasonable' responses). [They however] conclude that starting point biases 
should be amenable to control through care in the design of the CVM payment 
card." 
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Another source of error is Social Desirability Bias (SDB). The underlying notion of SDB is 
that the respondent wants to present her/himself in a favourable way, and consequently 
questions are answered in ways that will make the respondent look good (or avoid looking 
bad). "Social desirability is generally considered to be a major source of response bias in 
survey research." (DeMaio, 1984). A defmition of social desirability bias that she quotes is: 
" ... answers which reflect an attempt to enhance some socially desirable 
characteristics or minimize the presence of some socially undesirable 
characteristics. Source of the expectations or values influencing answers can be 
the person [her]/himself (ego threatening), the perception of the interviewer, or 
society as a whole." 
While the sources of these biases may be controlled or accounted for, it is still a matter of 
conjecture as to how 'true' these revealed valuations are in relation to 'market values'. 
Cummings et al. (1986) have suggested Reference Operating Conditions (ROC) relevant for 
the CVM so that 'reference accurate' measures are obtained. ROCs refer to the limits on the 
relevant circumstances under which the measurement is taken, so that errors do not exceed 
'reference accuracy', which is a summing up of of demonstrated possible sources of error as 
a percentage of estimated values. The ROCs suggested by Cummings et al; (1986) are: 
#1. Subjects must understand, be familiar with, the commodity to be valued. 
#2. Subjects must have had (or be allowed to obtain) prior valuation and choice experience 
with respect to consumption levels of the commodiity. 
#3. There must be little uncertainty. 
#4. WTP, not WT A, measures are elicited. 
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The rationale for these ROCs are noted by Cummings et al. (1986). For ROCs 1 and 2 the 
derivation is " ... directly from the market institution (which provides high quality 
information at low cost)". In addition ROC 1 is also derived from" ... results from 
psycological research [which] point to distortions in decision processes (framing biases, etc.) 
that arise when individuals are unfamiliar with decision contexts . . . . ROC 2 ... results 
from experimental economics emphasiz[ing] the importance of iterative trials [not questions] 
which serve to_ provide subjects with valuation and choice experience- subjects must 'learn' 
maximising strategies .... ROC 3 derives directly from research in psychology and 
experimental economics: under conditions of uncertainty, valuation decisions may be subject 
to distortions resulting from the use of a wide range of heuristic [learning] devices. [ROC 4] 
... WTA measures are generally found to be highly distorted vis-a-vis 'true' valuations as a 
possible result, psycologists would argue, of cognitive dissonance." Cummings et al. 
(1986) comment that 
"The relevance of the above-described ROC's lies in our expectation that, if the 
CVM institution satisfies them, we would expect the resulting measure of value 
to approximate market-analogous values within a range of error defined by 
'background' sources of error, suggested at the present time to be no less than 
±50 percent. If ROC's are not satisfied, the range of reference accuracy 
increases, reflecting the errors associated with the excluded ROC." 
The simulation of the market institutions as a framework for applying the CVM is motivated 
by wanting to emulate the incentives for preference revelation that economic theories lead us 
to expect from a market context. 
"In the market context, individuals must introspectively balance the utilities 
foregone as a result of paying for a good with the utilities gained from acquiring 
the good; to this end, he/she must, however 'completely', search his/her 
preferences for the good in question vis-a-vis all other possible goods and 
their prices (relative to his/her income). Thus ... the importance for 
assessments of the CVM of such themes as the subject's familiarity with a 
commodity (for the preference 'search', or research process) and the credibility 
of payment and payment modes (for meaningful subjective assessments of 
implied opportunity costs)" (Cummings et al., 1986). 
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Measurement p,roblems in surveys are most likely to occur when questions asked are vague 
and which are remote from the everyday concerns of respondents (Turner & Martin, 1984). 
As noted above Cummings et al. (1986) consider that the most prominent source of bias 
within the rubric of 'hypothetical bias' in CVM, occurs when the subject is unfamiliar with 
the commodity within a contingent exchange setting; that is that the subject has no experience 
in viewing the commodity within the context oftradeoffs. As Price (1978) notes: "The 
evidence indicates that it is not hard to confuse respondents .... " Familiarity and 
experience are considered to be a prerequisite for CVM commodities by Cummings et al. 
(1986). They are 
" ... compelled to conclude that results from the received literature offered little 
that would support the notion that subjects, during the relativity brief period of 
the CVM interview, could define their preferences for a new, unfamiliar 
commodity in any meaningful way - thus our use of ROC's 1 and 2 . . . . [The 
ROC 1 and 2] conditions then loosely require that ... the consumption bundles 
(including the CVM commodity) that the subject is hypothetically evaluating are 
within the neighborhoods of consumption bundles with which he/she has had 
experience." 
As a consumer moves from an 'existence value' to a hamburger, Cummings et al. (1986) 
" ... expect individuals to be increasingly familiar with the 'commodity' and to 
have had greater market-related experiences; along this continuum, uncertainties 
as to outcomes of transactions and potential for problems related to cognition are 
reduced." 
Consequently they consider that the ROC's preclude" ... the derivation of value estimates 
for unfamiliar and uncertain commodities such as those related to option, preservation and 
bequeathment values" (ibid.). The high country landscape which many people have 
experienced and are familiar with, is not a commodity that people have familiarity or 
experience within the context of tradeoffs. It is not a familiar commodity like the jam 
doughnut Evidence of this unfamiliarity of the landscape as a commodity is the 
" ... persistent belief that landscape is not measurable in money terms" (Price, 197 8). 
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Related to the need for familiarity and experience Kahneman (1986) considers that the use of 
CVM should be restricted to user values, rather than what he calls ideological values. He 
notes that 
" ... there is a class of problems in which people's answers to preference 
questions seem quite insensitive to the numbers that are mentioned in these 
questions. [This] willingness to choose among inadequately specified options 
suggests that the possibility of tradeoffs is neglected. Preferences of this kind 
appear to reflect a hierarchy of ideological values." 
Edwards (1987) considers that it seems reasonable to assume that the CVM, which is offered 
as a substitute for the market, is not intended to measure ideological values - but it may 
nonetheless be contaminated by such values. For example 
". . . ethical views that argue for the intrinsic value or rights of other 
humans,wildlife, and future generations could be personified by a genuine 
altruist with unselfish commitments to the well-being of others. The question 
thus arises: does such a stereotype of altruistic man- the antithesis of economic 
man - have implications for interpreting expressions of willingness - to - pay." 
This commitment to others as exibited by the altruist does, according to Sen (1977, quoted in 
Edwards, 1987), 
" ... involve, in a very real sense, counterpreferential choice, destroying the 
crucial assumption that a chosen alternative must be better than (or at least as 
good as) the others for the person choosing it, and this would certainly require 
that models be formulated in an essentially different way .... Commitment is, 
of course, closely related to one's morals .... it drives a wedge between 
personal choice and personal welfare, and much of traditional economic theory 
relies on the identity of the two." 
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While Kahnem:an (1986) considers that" ... users of CVM often deal with people who 
simply do not have the kind of coherent preference order that the theory assumes- especially 
in domains for which they lack market experience", the reason for this lack of coherent 
preference order may be due to the pluralistic system of preferences within individuals and 
throughout society that Kellert (1984) has investigated. Consequently, according to 
Edwards (1987), "Ethicists challenge economists for presuming, a priori, that people attempt 
to think and behave like economic man, and that the 'total' value of the natural environment 
can be measured in economic terms". An example of this 'incoherent' preference ordering 
has been noted by Kahneman (1986) where the results to questions on willingness to pay an 
extra tax to maintain fishing in some regions of Ontario 
" ... indicate that people seem to be willing to pay almost as much to clean up 
one region or any other, and almost as much for any one region as for all 
Ontario together. [The] responses do not reflect expectations of personal 
enjoyment from the clean up, since Toronto residents are willing to pay 
substantial amounts to clean up the lakes of British Columbia! People seem to 
answer such questions as if they had been asked "What do you want to do about 
keeping fish in our lakes?" and "How important is the issue to you?" The dollar 
number merely expresses the strength of the feeling that is aroused by these 
questions. Because the questions all elicit symbolic expressions of the same 
attitude, there is not much difference between the numbers that are attached to a 
single region and to all of Ontario. [Kahneman] call[s] this 'symbolic demand' 
because it is true of symbols that quantity is sometimes irrelevant." 
Because the evaluation of landscape is a subjective, and to many people, an emotional 
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process, it is highly likely the contingent valuation of the high country landscape would be 
subject to 'contamination' by ideological values. 
Along with restricting CVM to 'user values', Kahneman (1986) also considers that CVM 
should only be used for problems that have a 'purchase structure'. He distinguishes two 
structures of transaction: purchases and compensation. In a purchase payment is either made 
for things that will increase utility, or to prevent a normal and expected deteriation. It has 
what is called a 'purchase structure'. In what Kahneman (1986) calls a 'compensation 
structure', 
" ... we start with someone who has an endowment- for example a nice view, 
or clean air - which is threatened by some deliberate and optional action of other 
people. Giving up this part of the endowment will make the individual worse 
off than before. The individual is requested, and sometimes coerced, to see part 
of his or her endowment diminished in order to benefit someone else or society 
at large", 
and for which compensation may or may not be given. 
The use of CVM only in the 'purchase structure' is justified by Kahneman (1986) by the 
phenomena of what he calls 'loss aversion.' This is where individuals value losses 
disproportionately higher than identical gains. Thus, one would expect a subject's valuation 
of a gain (WTP) to be substantively different from his/her valuation of a loss of identical 
magnitude (WTA). An example of the buying-selling discrepancy is the 3:1 ratio of 
estimates ofWTA and WTP for hunting permits, which Kahneman comments appears to be 
very solidly documented [see Bishop, 1987]. Kahneman (1986) states that 
"If loss aversion is accepted as a fact of valuation, it follows that WTP is an 
acceptable method only for purchase transactions. In particular, WTP should 
not be used as a measure of value for people who are made to lose their clear air 
or trees because of the intervention of some other agent. The fairest way to 
represent such cases is by recognizing that the experience is a genuine loss, and 
that the compensation should reflect this fact." 
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Kahneman (1986) does not recomend using the WTA method to estimate this value, because 
this method is likely to produce useless results, but " ... the use of WTP is likely to yield 
serious underestimgttes of the value of a good in a compensation structure." Where 
exchanges are recurrent and reversible the individual becomes familiar with the experience of 
getting a thing_and giving it up. 
"What is given up is eventually perceived as an opportunity cost rather than a 
loss, and loss aversion is then not a factor. When a loss is imposed on an 
individual on a unique occasion, however, there is no reason to expect the 
evaluation of gains and losses to be so balanced. [B]y restricting the scope of 
CVM to measures of willingness-to-pay in problems that have a purchase 
structure, we may have restricted the applications of the method quite 
substantially. There are surely many cases of compensation structure in which 
we would like to measure value, but the measure of WT A is suspect and WTP is 
not an acceptable substitute" (Kahneman, 1986). 
[For further discusion on the discrepancy between WTP and WT A or compensation 
demanded see Gregory (1986)]. A question that Kahneman (1986) poses is then "How do 
we evaluate trees that are taken out to permit mining, but were doomed anyway by a pest?" 
In a similar fashion how do we evaluate a landscape that is going to be planted in trees, but 
was 'doomed' by wilding pine spread? However, as with Price's (1978) jam and cream 
doughnuts, attitudes and opinions about high country landscapes are varied and what is 
acceptable to one is anathema to another. This is in contrast to applications of CVM where 
one alternative is readily identifiable as 'bad' and the other 'good' (eg. air pollution and clean 
air). As with pine planting there are many other changes occurring in the high country, such 
as grassland 'improvement' or developments such as skifields, that may have a 
'compensation structure', and are thus not amenable to CVM. In addition changes that are 
amenable because they may have a 'purchase structure', such as wilding pine spread, but are 
closely interlinked with things such as pine planting, which may have a 'compensation 
stucture', could cause 'identification problems' or confusion by the respondent as to what 
s/he is responding about. 
While the CVM can be a valuable and useful tool, Cummings et al. (1986) consider that 
" ... given the present state of the arts, a limited number of environmental 
'commodities' are amenable to CVM applications, where the ROCs are satisfied. 
For such applications, where the ROCs are not satisfied, the present state of the 
arts does not allow us to conclude that accurate or inaccurate measures will 
result. [However] available evidence suggests that such measures may be 
seriously distorted." 
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From the evidence available to us at present, it points towards the landscape (be it high 
country or not) being 'not amenable' to having CVM applied to it without the risk of serious 
distortions to the derived values being present given our present understanding. This results 
both from failure to meet various ROCs and from objections raised by Kahneman (1986). 
However, as Cummings et al. (1986) comment 
" ... our colleagues in medical and engineering sciences consider, as a matter of 
course, estimates producing errors on the order of one to ten (one order of 
magnitude) to be normal; therefore, it is not clear that we should be disturbed if 
our value estimates are thought to be within ±50% of true values, or ±100%. 
Ranges of error of 3:1 or 5:1 may pale in significance when compared to those 
reflecting technical ignorance in most environmental fields." 
Indeed, as Kerr (1986) has noted, "In many instances an order of magnitude estimate of 
value will be sufficient for decision-making." Therefore, depending on the proposed 
application for the values derived, the contingent valuation method may or may not be an 
appropriate technique to ascertain the non-market values of the high country landscape. 
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SUMMARY 
1 There are changes that are occurring in the high country that warrant investigation as 
to their effects on the overall welfare of people. 
2 The rationale for doing benefit/cost assessments was investigated and a basis for 
undertaking CBA was found. 
3 Various non-market methods of value determination were reviewed and CVM was 
considered to be the most appropriate for further assessment. 
4 Attitudes and opinions about landscape were reviewed and found to individualistic 
and subjective. 
5 CVM and the various biases that can affect it were then reviewed. Relevant 
operating conditions for the use of CVM were considered. These are: 
#1. Subjects must understand, be familiar with, the commodity to be 
valued. 
#2. Subjects must have had (or be allowed to obtain) prior valuation and 
choice experience with respect to consumption levels of the 
commodiity. 
#3. There must be little uncertainty. 
#4. WTP, not WTA, measures are elicited. 
6 In addition the concepts of 'user values' and 'purchase structures' investigated. 
The findings of the review were: 
That there would be lack of experience and familiarity about the 
landscape as a commodity; 
That the risk of contamination by 'ideological' values is high; and 
That there would be problems with 'purchase/compensation' structures. 
7 As a consequnce the CVM was considered 'not amenable' to assessing the 
non-market values of the high country landscape, because of the risk of serious 
distortions to the derived values being present given our present understanding of 
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the approach, if values within 50% of market analogous values are required. 
8 However, in many instances even an estimate of value within an order of magnitude 
can be sufficient for decision-making. 
9 Therefore, depending on the proposed application for the values derived, the 
contingent valuation method may or may not be an appropriate technique to ascertain 
the non-market values of the high country landscape that would be of interest to 
government agencies such as the Department of Conservation or the Ministry for the 
Environment. 
10 Areas that further reseach are needed include that of landscape perception and the 
specification and measurement of Reference Accuracy for CVM measures. There is 
the need to further define relevant ROCs 
" ... and for calibrating errors with deviations from ROCs. Thus, we must 
ask questions exemplified by: What is 'familiarity' or 'experience' 
vis-a-vis a CVM commodity; what is 'uncertainty' and what constitutes 
'ideological content'; what variables may perform best as measures of 
cognition and/or affection and how are attitudinal variables calibrated with 
measures of attitude-behavior correspondence; how can we better structure 
value questions so as to enhaance a priori our expectations that preferences 
are obtained which are at least consonant with incentive-compatible 
revelations in market context?" (Cummings et al. 1986) 
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